Cornell Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 2 January 1973

Article 7

Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Loyalty
Oaths-Vagueness Standard Relaxed for Affirmative
Oaths
Mark D. Nozette

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mark D. Nozette, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Loyalty Oaths-Vagueness Standard Relaxed for Affirmative Oaths,
58 Cornell L. Rev. 383 (1973)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol58/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Constitutional Law-FIRsT

AMENDMENT-LOYALTY

NESS STANDARD RELAXED FOR "AFFIRMATIVE"

OATHS--VAGUE-

OATHS

Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972)
The onset of the Cold War was accompanied by an increasing use
of the loyalty oath as a condition of public employment.' Today about
one fifth of the civilian work force is subject to some form of loyalty
qualification. 2 The principal aim of these loyalty oath requirements is
to guard against the occupation of sensitive positions by those who
might adversely affect the public interest.3
Although the use of the loyalty oath raises a number of constitutional issues,4 the Supreme Court has failed to mount a direct assault
1 See, e.g., Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 2, 64 Stat. 987 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 781 (1970)). See also Hearings on Subversion and Espionage in Defense
Establishments and Industry Before the Perm. Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate
Comm. on Gov't Operations, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. pt. 1 (1954); id., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. pts.
2-6 (1954); id., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. pts. 7-8 (1955); id., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 9 (1956).
The loyalty-oath requirement has been carried to ridiculous extremes. It has
been required of college students receiving loans under the National Defense Education Act, of certain classes of applicants under the Medicare Act, and even of
members of private organizations such as the motion pictures director's union. At
one time Indiana required a loyalty oath from professional wrestlers.
C. Parrcsmsrr, THa AM RiCAN CONSTITUTION 539-40 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
Loyalty oaths are not a new phenomenon. During the English Civil War the story
was told of the helpless farmer who watched his fields destroyed by marching rebel and
royal forces preparing for the confrontation near Marston Moor. Challenged to declare
for king or parliament, he replied, "What, be they two at it again." H. HYMAN, To TRY
MEN'S SOULS 1 (1959).
The oaths demanded of the Tories during the Revolution and those required of
Southerners following the Civil War have been well documented. See H. HYMAN, supra, at
88-117, 251-66. See generally W. GELLHORN, TBE STATES AND SUBVERSION (1952); S. SToUFFER, COMMUNISM, CONFORMITY AND CIVI LmERTmS (1955).
2 T. EMERSON, Tm SYSTM oF FFRmOM OF EXPRESSION 206 (1970).
8 The fear of such danger was present on the bench as well: "In the context of our
time, [Communist Party] membership is ... relevant to effective and dependable government, and to the confidence of the electorate in its government." Garner v. Board of Pub.
Works, 841 U.S. 716, 725 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See also Comment, The Loyalty Oath as a Condition of Public Employment, 19 BAYLOR
L. REV. 479 (1967); Note, State Loyalty Programs and the Supreme Court, 43 IND. L.J. 462
(1968).
4 See Note, The National Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1180,

1178-76 (1972).
The two principal attacks which have been made against loyalty oaths per se are
that they constitute bills of attainder and that they violate first amendment liberties.
Following the Civil War a few oaths were invalidated when labelled as bills of at-
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upon such oaths, preferring to follow a balancing approach under
which first and fourteenth amendment considerations are weighed
against the government's interest in keeping sensitive positions free of
"subversives.",
Under this approach, particular oaths have been found to violate
rights of free association, 6 or to have a "chilling" effect on speech or
tainder, i.e., legislative action having the effect of punishing specific individuals, or easily
ascertainable members of a group, without benefit of trial. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9, cl.
3. In Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), a divided Court reversed the
criminal conviction of a Catholic priest who refused to swear to a loyalty oath required
by the Missouri constitution. In Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), a former
member of the Senate of Confederate Arkansas refused to take a loyalty oath required
by federal legislation. Both oaths were found to be bills of attainder.
In modem times the device has been used sparingly. But see United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 803 (1946) (House Appropriations Committee barred from prohibiting Treasury
Department from paying three federal employees because Committee considered employees "subversive"). Compare American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950)
(oath required of union officials held valid as protection against communist subversion
of labor movement), with United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (oath required of union
officials held to constitute bill of attainder). The modem argumefits against using the
bill of attainder theory are that the loyalty oath was not designed to punish, that failure
to sign such an oath results only in the loss of employment, and that any infringement
of rights is merely an incidental result of the state's protection of security interests. Note,
Loyalty Oaths, 77 YALE LJ. 739, 740-43 (1968).
It has also been argued that the loyalty oath is constitutionally defective because
such an oath by its very nature stigmatizes and inhibits belief or association as well as
conduct. Such a prohibition violates the theory of "absolute" first amendment rights.
Loyalty oaths ... tend to stifle all forms of unorthodox or unpopular thinking or expression ... which [have] played such a vital and beneficial role in the
history of this Nation. The result is a stultifying conformity which in the end may
well turn out to be more destructive to our free society than foreign agents could
ever hope to be. The course which we have been following the last decade is not
the course of a strong, free, secure people, but that of the frightened, the insecure,
the intolerant. I am certain that loyalty to the United States can never be secured
by the endless proliferation of "loyalty" oaths; loyalty must arise spontaneously
from the hearts of people who love their country and respect their government.
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 532 (1958) (Black, J., concurring). See also Linde, Justice
Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State, 39 WASH. L. Rxv. 4, 34-42 (1964). A majority
of the Court, however, has never adopted the contention. See generally Garner v. Board
of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945).
5 See generally Note, supra note 4, 85 HARv. L. Rv. at 1173-76.
6 Although "freedom of association" is not mentioned in the Constitution, it has
been recognized by the Court as protected by both the first and fourteenth amendments.
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
Freedom of association has been the constitutional right most often considered in the
loyalty oath context. Because many of the oaths challenged during the 1950's and 1960's
were specifically designed to keep members of the Communist party out of government
positions, the Court had to consider both the interests of the government in keeping
"agents of a foreign power" out of key positions and the right of individuals to join
political groups. The Court thought it was wrong to assume disloyalty automatically
from membership association with the Communist party. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff,
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expression.7 Other oaths have been considered ex post facto laws," or
344 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1952) (state may not require disclaimer of membership in subversive
organization as condition of employment). Moreover, as the challenges continued, the
Court went further and held that loyalty oaths could only exclude members of subversive

organizations who had the specific intent (scienter) to further the goals of such organizations. See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 17 (1966) (those not participating in organization's unlawful activities pose no threat, either as citizens or employees); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (same). Compare Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967) (New York Feinberg Law requiring removal from employment for treasonable or
seditious utterances too broad, vague, and complicated), with Adler v. Board of Educ.,
342 U.S. 485 (1952) (Feinberg Law valid exercise of state police power over education).
See also Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (oath lacking "terms

susceptible to objective measurement" fails to inform oathtaker what state commands
or forbids); 16 DEPAuL L. Rav. 209 (1967); 18 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 865 (1967).

The concern for scienter is an outgrowth of the Court's activities in the Smith Act
cases. The Smith Act (Alien Registration Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970)) made it

a crime to belong to an organization subsequently found to advocate the overthrow of
the government. After the peak of the McCarthy period had passed, the Court held that
a Smith Act conviction would be affirmed only if the government had proved that a defendant had advocated the overthrow of the government to a large and cohesive group
which is "sufficiently oriented towards action, and other circumstances are such as reasonably justify apprehension that action will occur." Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298,
321 (1957). See C. Parrcim-r, supra note 1, at 526-33.
The Court is willing to grant states considerable leeway to demand disclosure of
membership in subversive organizations as a first step in determining if that membership is active. See Law Student Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971) (right of state to make inquiries of bar applicants); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36 (1961) (same); cf. Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); Application of Stolar, 401
U.S. 23 (1971). See also Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 (1958) (state may discharge subway
employee for failure to answer questions on subversive activities if it has reasonable
grounds to doubt employee's reliability); Beilan v. Board of Pub. Educ., 357 U.S. 399
(1958) (discharge of teacher on grounds of "incompetence" upheld because teacher failed
to answer questions relating to subversive activities). The approach on this point has not
changed since the early fifties. See Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951)
(discharge of employee who failed to take loyalty oath).
7 See cases cited in note 6 supra. See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960)
(broad inquiries into activities of nonsubversive character may not be made); Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (loyalty oaths may conflict with academic freedom);
Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (per curiam) (requirement of oath for political candidate held valid); Murphy, Academic Freedom-An Emerging Constitutional Right, 28 Aiw & CONTEMP. PROB. 447 (1963); Comment, Loyalty
Requirements vs. Academic Freedom, 52 MARQ. L. Rxv. 251 (1968); 18 CAsE W. Rxs. L.
Rav. 1802 (1967).
The claim that a loyalty oath might chill rights of free association and the claim
that a pledge might inhibit rights of speech and expression are really the same. The
Court has simply said that a valid loyalty oath can serve only to keep active subversives
out of government positions and that a state employee need not promise to refrain from
any other type of activity. See Note, Loyalty Oaths, 77 YALE L.J. 739 (1968). The argument is buttressed in Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966), where the Court treats
the two theories as interchangeable.
8 This theory might be raised in connection with an oath which demands that an
affiant swear that he "has never been" a member of a subversive organization or partici-
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worship.10

barriers to freedom of
or the right to
Furthermore,
certain statutory oath requirements have been held violative of procedural due process." This arsenal of constitutional theories has given
the Court considerable flexibility in dealing with issues arising from
specific loyalty oath statutes. Yet the Court has been reluctant to
extend the theoretical bases for declaring particular loyalty oaths void.12
Cole v. Richardson' represents the most recent example of this reluctance.
The plaintiff in Cole, Mrs. Lucretia Peteros Richardson, was appointed as a research sociologist by the Boston State Hospital in late
1968. Soon after beginning work, she was routinely asked to take the
loyalty oath required of all employees of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The oath read:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend
the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constipated in "subversive activities." See, e.g., Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S.

278 (1961). But see note 39 and accompanying text infra. The Court used the ex post
facto theory in Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866), and Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866), to buttress its claim that the oaths involved were bills of
attainder. Although the laws involved were not criminal according to the test of Calder
v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 269 (1798), they did exact "punishment" for acts which were not
criminal when committed.
In American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), the Court implied
that if the oath involved had prohibited past Communist party membership it would
have been invalid. See generally Barnett, The Constitutionality of the Expurgatory Oath
Requirement of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 27 OPa. L. REv. 85 (1949).
The oath at issue in Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 12-13 (1966), appears to have been
carefully drafted so as to avoid an ex post facto problem.
9 Cf. Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (per curiam).
10 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The holding is
based on other grounds as well. See note 43 and accompanying text infra.
11 Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960), on remand, 58 Wash. 2d 111, 361 P.2d
551 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 368 U.S. 436 (1962) (state must afford employee procedural
due process by specifying charges and giving him opportunity to be heard). See also Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (state must bear burden of proof at administrative hearing in order to deny veteran special tax exemption on disloyalty grounds); notes 73-86
and accompanying text infra.
The requirement of a hearing logically follows from the necessity of proving scienter.
See note 6 and accompanying text supra. See also note 76 and accompanying text infra.
12 See, e.g., Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) (oath provision requiring
promise of support for federal and state constitutions constitutionally valid); Nelson v.
County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960) (county employees may be dismissed for refusing to answer questions of congressional committee); Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152
(D. Colo. 1969), aff'd mem., 397 U.S. 317 (1970) (oath requiring promise to uphold federal
and state constitutions valid). But see Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551
(1956).
13 405 U.S. 676 (1972), aff'g Crim. No. 69-302-G (D. Mass., July 1, 1970), on remand
from 397 U.S. 238 (1970), vacating and remanding 300 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Mass. 1969).
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tution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the United States of
America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any
illegal or unconstitutional method. 14
Mrs. Richardson refused to sign the oath and as a result her employment was terminated.
In March 1969, Mrs. Richardson brought suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against the hospital superintendent and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, contending that the oath violated her first and fourteenth amendment
rights. Her complaint also prayed for damages15 and injunctive relief
against the continued enforcement of the Massachusetts loyalty oath
statute.
A three-judge panel rejected the damage claim,"6 but held the
17
oath to be unconstitutional and granted the injunctive relief sought.
8
Defendants appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court.'
After some delay,' 9 the Court noted probable jurisdiction" and then
of section fourteen shall be
14 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 264, § 14 (1966). 'iolation
punished by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not
more than one year, or both." Id. § 15.
16 After the formal termination of her employment, Mrs. Richardson agreed to work
full time at the hospital on a volunteer basis. She then demanded the back pay to cover
her services during this post-termination period. 397 U.S. at 239.
16 Richardson v. Cole, 300 F. Supp. 1321 (D. Mass. 1969).
17 Actually, the lower court found that part of the oath passed constitutional muster.
The first clause, reading "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend
the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts," was acceptable. Id. at 1322. Accord, Knight v. Board of Regents,
269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), af'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 36 (1968). However, the
second clause, reading "and that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of the
United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or
unconstitutional method," was held to be void for vagueness. 300 F. Supp. at 1323.
According to Massachusetts case law, the two clauses were not severable; thus, the
entire oath fell. See Pedlosky v. MIT, 352 Mass. 127, 224 N.E2d 414 (1967). But see Cramp
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (Court willing to sever two clauses of
oath).

18 28 US.C. § 1253 (1970).
19 The district court entered its opinion on June 26, 1969. 300 F. Supp. at 1321. Defendant docketed an appeal with the Supreme Court on September 29, 1969. The plaintiff then filed a motion on October 25, 1969, appealing the failure of the lower court to
grant her damage prayer, and asking the Supreme Court alternatively to affirm the district court's decision on the injunction or to dismiss the suit on mootness grounds. 397
U.S. 238, 239 (1969). The plaintiff claimed that her job was no longer in existence, and
no doubt preferred a dismissal for mootness than one on the merits. The defendant resisted plaintiff's motion by introducing an affidavit from the hospital superintendent in
which the administrator claimed to be holding Mrs. Richardson's job open for her if
only Mrs. Richardson would sign the oath. Id. at 242.
The Supreme Court vacated the lower court judgment and remanded the case back
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reversed the judgment below, 21 holding "that the Massachusetts oath
22
is constitutionally permissible."
I
THE AFFIRMATIVE OATH AND THE VAGUENESS TEST

Plaintiff first challenged the Massachusetts oath as void for vagueness under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 This
form of attack gave the Court an opportunity to reach fundamental
first amendment issues. 24 Plaintiff argued that a vague oath does not
impose a standard of conduct which can be objectively measured. The
sincere oath taker might therefore refrain from forms of expression,
criticism, or association protected by the first amendment because he
mistakenly believes his oath requires that he do so. 25
The Court had previously found merit in this contention. 2 Shortly
before Cole, however, the vagueness doctrine came under closer
scrutiny in the context of loyalty oath controversies. 27 1Indeed, the result
in Cole was foreshadowed by the Court's earlier actions in a number
29
of cases,28 most particularly Knight v. Board of Regents.

to the district court to determine the issue of mootness. Id. at 238. At that time, Mr.
Justice Harlan, concurring, pointed out that the underlying reason for the "unusual disposition" was the hope of the Court that that issue would be settled below. "I am," he
said, "content to acquiesce in the Court's action because of the manifest triviality of the
impact of the oath under challenge .... " Id. at 240.
The litigation did not end on remand. In an unreported opinion dated July 1, 1970,
the district court concluded that the issue was not moot. See 405 U.S. at 679. The case
went back to the Supreme Court, although Mrs. Richardson abandoned her damage
claim. Id.
20 403 U.S. 917 (1971).
21 405 U.S. 676 (1972).
22 Id. at 679.
23 300 F. Supp. at 1322; 405 U.S. at 685. This complaint has also been referred to as
"overbreadth." See Note, supra note 4, 77 YALE L.J. at 748-50.
24 See notes 6-11 and accompanying text supra. The guarantees of the first amendment are applicable on the state level. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
25 See 405 U.S. at 689 n.3 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 695 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 872 (1964).
26 See Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 868 U.S. 278 (1961). See generally United
States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 806 U.S. 451, 453 (1939);
Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 242-43 (1932); Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 891 (1926); Note, Vagueness-The Crippler of Loyalty
Oaths, 25 Mo. L. Rav. 64 (1965); Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67 (1960).
27 See cases cited in note 12 supra.
28 See cases cited in note 12 supra.
29 390 U.S. 36 (1968), aff'g per curiam 269 F. Supp. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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In Knight, twenty-seven members of the Adelphi University faculty
brought suit in federal district court to enjoin the enforcement of a
New York loyalty oath statute applying to employees of tax-exempt
private institutions. 30 The key part of the New York oath asked affiants
to swear to "support the constitution of the United States of America
81
and the constitution of the State of New York."
A three-judge court rejected petitioners' claims that the New York
oath was void for vagueness and found that the required pledge passed
constitutional muster.8 2 This oath, the district court indicated, merely
required employees to affirm their loyalty to their country and did not
infringe upon any of their first amendment rights. Thus, reasoned the
court, it was "simple and clear in its import."8 3
The court made a novel distinction between the New York oath
and those oaths previously declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court.3 4 The Knight oath was held to be "affirmative" in character. 85

Oaths found constitutionally defective in the past were characterized as
"negative oaths"3 0 which, the Court claimed, presented "a very different
87
problem."
A constitutional standard based on an affirmative/negative dichotomy is appealing in its simplicity. Yet closer examination reveals the
80 It shall be unlawful for any citizen of the United States to serve as a teacher,
instructor or professor in any school or institution in the public school system of
the state or in any school, college, university, or other educational institution in
this state, whose real property, in whole or in part, is exempt from taxation under section four of the tax law unless and until he or she shall have taken and
subscribed the following oath or affirmation ....
N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 8002 (McKinney 1970).
81 The oath reads as follows:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution of the United
States of America and the constitution of the State of New York, and that I will
faithfully discharge, according to the best of my ability, the duties of the position
of ....
to which I am now assigned.
Id.
82 269 F. Supp. at 340-41.
83 Id. at 841.
34 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 884
U.S. 11 (1966); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).
35 269 F. Supp. at 341. The oath was compared favorably with one approved in
Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966). In citing Bond, the court relied on Supreme Court
dictum which implied that a state legislature had the right to require that its members
take an oath before assuming office. The issue in Bond, however, was not the validity of
the oath itself, but rather whether the Georgia legislature could exclude Julian Bond, a
black civil rights leader, because it "felt" that as an opponent of the Vietnam War, he
could not sincerely swear to an oath of allegiance.
30 269 F. Supp. at 841.
37 Id.
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weakness of such a distinction. The Knight opinion justifies the distinction by asserting that negative oaths "typically require an affiant to
state that he is not now and has never been a member of certain organizations,"38 implying that a negative oath might be defective as an
ex post facto law. 9 However, not all oaths which the Supreme Court
has struck down were couched in negative language,4 0 nor could they
all be classified as "ex post facto." 4 ' Moreover, even assuming that
Knight's analysis of past cases is correct, it still does not reach the
vagueness issue posed by the plaintiff in Cole 2
Knight also ignores at least one additional first amendment issue raised by an affirmative oath. In attempting to distinguish West
88 Id.

89 See Note, supra note 4, 77 YALE L.J. at 759-60. See also note 8 and accompanying
text supra.
The Court does not make this point clear. If it does not mean to say that negative
oath statutes are invalid as ex post facto laws, however, it would seem that the affirmative/negative distinction must fail. No other ground on which a constitutional differentiation may rest is offered.
40 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964). The Knight court distinguished Baggett
as involving a negative loyalty oath. 269 F. Supp. at 341. This was technically correct
since one of the statutes involved in Baggett required all Washington state employees,
including teachers, to sign the following pledge: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I
am not a member of the Communist party or knowingly of any other subversive organization." 377 U.S. at 864. However, the court neglected to point out that the Baggett decision also rejected an additional oath applicable only to teachers employed by the state.
That oath read:
I, the undersigned, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support the constitution and laws of the United States of America and of the state of Washington, and will by precept and example promote respect for the flag and the
institutions of the United States of America and the state of Washington, reverence for law and order, and undivided allegiance to the government of the
United States ....
Id.
Justice White, in his lengthy opinion, did not mention that the more widely used
oath was couched in negative terms while the teachers' oath was affirmative in nature.
Indeed, in voiding the affirmative oath on vagueness grounds, the Court relied heavily
on Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 868 U.S. 278 (1961), a negative oath case. See 377
U.S. at 366-68.
Knight does not explain why the Baggett Court did not make the negative/affirmative distinction given a clear opportunity to do so, nor does it indicate why a Washington state teacher is not obliged to sign an affirmative oath while a New York state teacher
must. If Knight is to be viable, therefore, other grounds of support would seem essential.
41 Neither Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), nor Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.
11 (1966), could be classified as ex post facto cases. See note 8 supra.
42 Indeed, the affirmative/negative distinction makes the law even more confusing.
[]he Knight decision holds out the prospect that every "negative" loyalty oath
-including the ones the Court has invalidated-may rise again in a new, constitutionally approved, "affirmative" aspect. A state so inclined could define "allegiance" to the government in just the terms of nonsubversive status and
non-Communist Party membership that fell in the cases up to Knight.... Even
if the Court pierces through the "affirmative" surface of such a statute to reach
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Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnett, 43 the court did not
consider the conclusion of Mr. Justice Jackson, writing for the majority,
that free speech includes the right not to be compelled to state or discuss
one's political beliefs.44 In Jackson's view the first amendment does not
force an individual "to utter what is not in his mind. ' 45 In contrast,
the Knight court argues that a public pledge of loyalty is something
which every citizen has always been "understood to owe his sovereign. '4
Despite these seeming conflicts with prior law, the Supreme Court
affirmed Knight without opinion.47 In Cole the Court went one step
further and explicitly 8 adopted the rationale of Knight.49 In approving
the first clause of the oath in Cole-the affirmative promise to "uphold"
the Constitutions of the United States and the State of MassachusettsChief Justice Burger merely borrowed the Knight analysis. Any oath
which does not force an affiant to "reach back . . . to recall minor,
sometimes innocent, activities" is now constitutionally acceptable. 50
The second clause of the Massachusetts oath, however, demanded
its "negative" underpinnings, the Knight decision will have only precipated [sic]
another round of litigation....
Note, supra note 4, 77 YALE L.J. at 763-64.
43 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
44 "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
Id. at 642.
45 Id. at 634.
46 269 F. Supp. at 341.
47 390 U.S. 36 (1968) (per curiam).
48 The first clause in the Cole oath

was indistinguishable from the comparable
clause in Knight. No member of the Supreme Court objected to the first clause in Cole;
in fact, eight members of the Court expressly approved of the first clause. Justice Douglas
was silent on the matter, choosing to reject the Massachusetts oath on the basis of the
second clause. See notes 58-62 and accompanying text infra.
49 The Knight reasoning employed in Cole can be summarized as follows: (1) a
similar oath was affirmed in Bond (but see note 35 supra); (2) the Cole oath was "forward
looking"-an allusion to the affirmative/negative/ex post facto reasoning in Knight; and
(3) the oath was not vague. See note 70 infra.
The Chief Justice also compared the "uphold" portion of Cole oath to the oath
which the President of the United States takes upon assuming office. See U.S. CONsr. art.
II, § 1, ci. 8. The Court did not, however, discuss the differing responsibilities of presidents and hospital sociologists. The difference is of constitutional significance.
Mrs. Richardson argued that her political beliefs have no relevance to her competence as a member of a hospital staff and that her dismissal for anything short of activities endangering the national security could not be tolerated under the first and
fourteenth amendments. For a president or other high official, however, political beliefs
do have a certain relevance to job qualifications. Indeed, it might be argued that "upholding" the constitution and "opposing" attempts to overthrow the established governmental structure are the essence of a high public official's professional responsibilities.
5O 405 U.S. at 681.
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a more extensive discussion by the Chief Justice. This clause required
the affiant to "oppose" the overthrow of the United States and Massachusetts governments by violent or "unconstitutional" means.51 The
lower court had rejected this language as too vague because it might
be interpreted as demanding affirmative conduct on the part of the
affiant. 52 The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning that the lower court's
approach was too "literal" and that the court had failed to recognize
that the second clause was merely a restatement of the first. 53 That this
reading of the oath made the two clauses redundant was irrelevant:
"Such repetition.., seems to be the wont of authors of oaths.... [W]e
are not charged with correcting grammar but with enforcing a constitution." 54
Dissent was generated by the Chief Justice's treatment of the
"oppose" clause. Only Mr. Justice Blackmun accepted the Chief Justice's reasoning. 55 Justices Stewart and White simply said that the
second clause was no more "vague" or "overbroad" than the first and,
on that ground alone, concurred. 6 But Justices Douglas, Brennan, and
Marshall would have affirmed the lower court's decision, striking the
second clause and thereby invalidating the entire oath.57
In his dissent, Mr. Justice Douglas neither discussed the vagueness
question nor attempted to respond to the specific points raised by the
Chief Justice. He simply pronounced the oppose clause "plainly unconstitutional by our decisions"5 " and then commented in rather summary
fashion on first amendment issues raised by loyalty oaths. 59 Such oaths,
he indicated, were "aimed at coercing and controlling the minds of
51 Id. at 683.
52 300 F. Supp. at 1322.
53 405 U.S. at 684.
54 Id.

55 Justices Powell and Rehnquist did not participate in either the consideration or
decision of this case.
56 405 U.S. at 687. Justice White seems to have changed his position from the time
he wrote the Baggett opinion. There he indicated that an oath would be invalid if its
language made an affiant hesitate "to ally himself with any interest group dedicated

to opposing any current public policy or law of the Federal Government, for if he did,
he might well be accused of placing loyalty to the group above allegiance to the United
States." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964) (emphasis added).
57 This result is dictated by Massachusetts procedure. See note 17 supra.
58 405 U.S. at 687. Mr. Justice Douglas did not mention the "uphold" clause. See
note 48 supra. Since the second clause was found defective and the court refused to sever
the two clauses, the entire oath could be declared invalid.
59 Mr. Justice Douglas's rather cursory treatment of the first amendment issues in
Cole perhaps results from his earlier lengthy treatment of the problems in Lerner v. Casey,
357 U.S. 468, 479 (1958).
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men." 60 Even a restrictive interpretation of the first amendment allowed
for advocacy, discussion, and teaching of obnoxious political views. 61
Therefore, since it required Mrs. Richardson to "oppose" what "she
has an indisputable right to advocate,"6 2 the Massachusetts oath must
fall.
Mr. Justice Marshall's dissent, in which Mr. Justice Brennan
joined, was not as philosophical in tone and attempted to discuss more
fully the legal issues raised by the Chief Justice. While Marshall
was willing to tolerate the uphold clause as a harmless "expression of
'minimal loyalty to the Government,' "163 he found the oppose clause
to be both vague and overbroad.64 The clause was vague because it did
not establish a clearly discernable standard of conduct for an affiant to
follow;6 5 it was overbroad because its ambiguous language could be
interpreted as imposing unconstitutional infringements on an afflant's
60 405 U.S. at 688.
61 Mr. Justice Douglas was quick to point out, however, that "[t]he views of Mr.
Justice Black and me give the First Amendment a more expansive reading." Id. Under
such an "absolute" interpretation of the first amendment, the dangers of loyalty oaths

are even clearer.
62 Id. at 689.
63 Id. at 696. This statement offers a due to Marshall's (and probably Brennan's)
view of the oath in Knight as well as of the first clause of the oath in Cole. Whereas the
Knight court saw the affirmative character of the oath as the feature which distinguished
it from oaths previously rejected by the Supreme Court, Marshall does not see the affirmative/negative dichotomy as important per se. The Knight oath could be sustained
on pragmatic grounds because it was, in the Chief Justice's words, an "amenity," imposing de minimus restrictions. Id. at 685. However, if an affirmative oath begins to infringe
on protected liberties, then, by this view, it must fall like the negative oaths of the past.
Marshall recognized, of course, that "[t]he Court's prior decisions represent a judgment
that simple affirmative oaths of support are less suspect and less evil than negative oaths
requiring a disaffirmance of political ties, group affiliations, or beliefs." Id. at 695 (emphasis added). However, he had been willing to accept these judgments because the
particular affirmative oaths involved were "simple" and not because they were merely
"affirmative." Once these oaths lose their simplicity, they "have odious connotations and
. . . they present dangers." Id. Under Marshall's view the two clauses in Cole represent
opposite poles of the simple/odious distinction.
64 Id. at 692.

65 The dissent argued that there are two different points of confusion in the second
clause. First, the construction of the clause indicates that an affiant is under an obligation either to oppose, by peaceful means, violent attempts to overthrow the government,
or to oppose, by violent means, all attempts to overthrow the government. Marshall contends that the second construction is more dangerous, but he appears to concede that it
is also less plausible. Id. at 692-93.
Second, the oath does not indicate how an affiant is to oppose the overthrow of the
government. See generally Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 868 U.S. 278, 286 (1961)

(Stewart, J.).
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speech and conduct. 66 Thus, Marshall considered merely possible an

interpretation which Douglas had assumed to be automatic.
Marshall was also concerned with the potential of turning a state
employee who wishes to retain his job into a state-supported vigilante.
According to the Massachusetts Attorney General:
[I]n the event that a dear and present danger arose of the actual
overthrow of the government,... the public employee [would] be
required to use reasonable means at his disposal to attempt to
thwart that effort. What he might do in such circumstances could
range from the use of physical force to speaking out against the
downfall of the government. The kind of response required would
be commensurate with the circumstances and with the employee's
ability, his training, and the means available to him at the time. 67

This construction once again raised the problem of interpretation
which had plagued the Court when dealing with the so-called negative
oath: What must a sincere oathtaker do to keep his promise?

The Chief Justice merely found no ambiguity in the instant
oath. 68 Ignoring the statement of the Massachusetts Attorney General,
he contended that the Massachusetts legislature could not possibly have

intended to impose a duty of affirmative conduct on affiants when the
statute was passed in 1948.69 Moreover, even if Massachusetts brought

a criminal suit under this law, 70 a vigilant Supreme Court, protective of
66 405 U.S. at 695.
67 Id. at 693 n.3 (emphasis in original). Massachusetts expanded on this argument
in the course of its oral presentation below. It noted then that there were
three standards of obligation to take active steps to "oppose" the overthrow of
the government by force or violence. The ordinary citizen who has taken no oath
has an obligation to act in extremis; a person who has taken the first part of the
present oath would have a somewhat larger obligation, and one who has taken
the second part has one still larger.
300 F. Supp. at 1322.
68 405 U.S. at 685.
69 Id. at 684-85.
70 The Chief Justice interpreted the Massachusetts statute as limiting criminal charges
to perjury. This is a convenient way of sidestepping the scienter requirement. See note 6
supra; note 76 infra. According to this analysis a public employee could only be subjected to criminal prosecution if he took the oath while he was intentionally and knowingly engaged in illegal activities designed to overthrow the government. If an employee
took the oath with a sincere desire to live up to its terms, only to later find himself involved in what the state considered to be a subversive activity, no prosecution could take
place. 405 U.S. at 685. Thus, an affiant need not discern any standard of loyalty from the
pledge, since only honesty is required of him.
Even assuming that Chief Justice Burger's interpretation is correct, it does not take
into account the effect of the Cole oath on one who innocently believes that the pledge
requires him to "steer far wider of the unlawful zone" (Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958)) than is necessary on the mistaken belief that this oath requires him to do so.
See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
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first amendment rights, could prevent any "harassment." 71 This reply
merely begs the question.
The significance of Cole is that it illustrates the tremendous opportunity for utilization of the affirmative oath concept introduced in
Knight. States can now use "forward looking" or "positive" language
to enact vague oaths inhibiting protected speech and conduct which
once would have been found unconstitutional had they been drafted
in negative terms. Moreover, the Chief Justice's opinion raises the
possibility that an affirmative oath may legitimately require a citizen
72
to prove his loyalty to the state by means of affirmative acts.
II
DUE PROCESS

HEARING REQUIREMENT

The plaintiff in Cole also attacked the Massachusetts oath procedure for its failure to provide a hearing prior to the termination of
her employment. 73 In prior cases where the Court had upheld particular loyalty oaths, it had demanded that a person refusing to subscribe to such an oath be afforded an opportunity to explain his
reasons for doing so. 74 Indeed, the hearing procedure became a pracBy interpreting the danger of criminal sanctions in this way, the plurality can then
call the oath an "amenity." Indeed, the implication of the Chief Justice's entire opinion
is that the oaths really are not important any more, so quibbling over language makes
little difference and wastes considerable time. The Chief Justice also expressed what
might be his own hope that "[t)he time may come when the value of oaths in routine
public employment will be thought not 'worth the candle."' 405 U.S. at 685 n.3.
71 The language of the Court is revealing:
Those who view the Massachusetts oath in terms of an endless "parade of horribles" would do well to bear in mind that many of the hazards of human existence
that can be imagined are circumscribed by the classic observation of Mr. Justice
Holmes, when confronted with the prophecy of dire consequences of certain judicial action, that it would not occur "while this Court sits."
405 U.S. at 685-86, quoting Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (Holmes, J.,

dissenting).
72 This conclusion can be drawn from two factors. First, the Chief Justice failed to
refute directly the interpretation of the oath by the Massachusetts Attorney General.
Second, the Chief Justice took considerable pains to argue that this oath does not indude a requirement of affirmative conduct. See notes 52-54 and accompanying text supra.
But if the Court were to come upon an oath which did make such a demand, Burger
indicated that such an oath would only "raise serious questions" (405 U.S. at 684-85), and
that the Court's responsibility in such a situation would be limited to protecting an individual against "harassment." Id. at 685. The Court did not indicate what would constitute "harassment" or how those "serious questions" would be answered.
73 405 U.S. at 686.
74 See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 842 U.S. 485, 495 (1952); Garner v. Board of
Pub. Works, 241 U.S. 716, 723-24 (1951). The leading case in the area is probably Speiser
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tical necessity when the Court developed its "scienter" requirement,"8

which, in effect, prohibited the dismissal of an employee unless it
could be shown that he was willfully engaged in an attempt to over76
throw the government.
The Court was not impressed with the demand for a hearing and
dealt with the issue only briefly.7 7 The Chief Justice suggested that a
hearing would be required only in those cases where an affiant was
forced to swear to an "impermissible oath."7 8 The Court cited no authority for this statement and failed to distinguish substantial precedent" to the contrary.
The Court indicated that the two cases cited by plaintiff in support
of her prayer for a hearing, Nostrand v. Littles° and Connell v. Higginbotham,8s were distinguishable, although it did not offer any factual
or legal grounds for such a distinction.8 2 Indeed, the Cole Court's apv. Randall, 857 U.S. 513 (1958). In that case California refused to give two honorably
discharged World War II veterans a property tax exemption to which they were other-

wise entitled because they refused to sign the loyalty oath required by the California
constitution. Id. at 516. Mr. Justice Brennan implicitly recognized the absolute right of
these taxpayers to a hearing before they could be labeled disloyal. He went further,
however, to require explicitly that the burden of proof at a hearing on the issue of
the taxpayers' loyalty be placed on the state. The state cannot "'declare an individual
guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime."' Id. at 524, quoting McFarland v. American
Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86 (1916). See generally Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 277, 828 (1866); 4 A. HAmImTON, WoRKs 269-70 (H-. Lodge ed. 1904).
75 See note 6 supra.
76 The Court has never questioned the right of the state to discharge disloyal employees. However, the Court has defined disloyalty to include the element of scienter, or
actions done with the specific intent of attempting to overthrow the government. A
loyalty oath which purports to put greater restrictions on an afflant would not, therefore,
be valid. Moreover, mere refusal to sign a loyalty oath could not be proof of "disloyalty"
when the term is defined to require scienter. See Adler v. Board of Educ., 842 U.S. 485,
490-91 (1952). Thus, a hearing is required to determine intent.
Of course, an employee who swears falsely to a loyalty oath could also be dismissed
on security grounds. However, perjury must also be proven at a hearing-even after
Cole. See 405 U.S. at 685.
77 405 U.S. at 686.
-78 Id.

79 See Speiser v. Randall, 857 U.S. 513, 520-29 (1957); Adler v. Board of Educ., 842
U.S. 485, 495 (1952); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 841 U.S. 716, 728-24 (1951); cf.
Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 850 U.S. 551 (1956).
80 362 U.S. 474 (1960).
81 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
82 405 U.S. at 686. In Nostrand, the Court remanded a declaratory judgment suit in
order to allow the Supreme Court of the State of Washington to determine whether the
state statute afforded an employee a hearing at which he could explain his refusal to take
an oath. 862 U.S. at 475-76. The Court implied that without such a hearing the statute
must fall. On remand the state court found that the statute did include procedure for a
hearing (58 Wash. 2d 111, 861 P.2d 551 (1961)), and for that reason the Supreme Court sus-
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proving description of the holding in those cases, "that the mere refusal
to take [a] particular oath was not a constitutionally permissible basis
for termination [of employment]," 8 was a precise statement of plaintiff's theory.
The hearing requirement has in the past insured procedural due
process for those refusing to take a loyalty oath. It removes the "self
executing" character of the pledges and bars the state from automatically preventing nonsubscribing citizens from enjoying some governmental benefit to which they would otherwise be entitled."" Moreover,
"by insisting on a hearing the Court [has] forced the state to assume the
administrative burdens of operating a security program rather than
relying on the automatic effect of a refusal to swear allegiance."8 5 In a
few sentences the Cole Court penetrated these "defenses" and, in effect,
returned to the loyalty oath its most odious quality: the presumption
that anyone who refuses to take one is disloyal to his country.8 6
CONCLUSION

The majority opinions in Cole signal the willingness of some members of the Supreme Court to sanction loyalty oaths which potentially
conflict with first or fourteenth amendment rights. A neat twist of language has enabled the Court to relax the standards which states must
meet in drafting constitutionally acceptable oaths. Moreover, the retained the oath when the suit came up again. 368 U.S. 436 (1962). The report of the case
did not offer any peculiar factor present in Nostrand which would justify requiring a hearing there but not in Cole.

The Connell case offers an excellent example of the Court's different approaches to
affirmative and negative oaths as well as of its flexible attitude with regard to hearings. In Connell the Court upheld the power of a state to demand from its employees
an oath to support the national and state constitutions, but not an oath asking each employee to pledge that he did not believe in the overthrow of the state or federal governments by force or violence. "Justification for this gossamer distinction was based by the
majority on the failure to provide a hearing system to determine whether there was more
than mere belief involved in the second requirement." P. Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on
the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 Sup. Cr. REv. 265, 292. As it did later in Cole,
the Court in Connell failed to indicate why a hearing was unnecessary for the first clause.
The first clause in the Connell oath might well fit under Justice Marshall's label of
"simple" and thus be too trivial to demand a hearing. See note 63 supra. If so, this fact
could also explain Justice Marshall's failure to mention the hearing issue in his Cole
dissent. Like Nostrand, Connell does not appear distinguishable from Cole on the hearing issue.
83 405 U.S. at 686.
84 Note, supra note 4, 77 YALE L.J. at 739.
8r Id. at 747.
80 Id. at 764.
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moval of the hearing requirement has given state legislatures a new
incentive to pursue loyalty security programs with full vigor if political
expediency again demands such programs. The controversies which had
seemingly been settled-vagueness, overbreadth, due process, and scienter-can now be re-opened under the guise of an "affirmative" oath.
The line of cases so painstakingly erected as a defense for constitutionally protected rights is proving to be a Maginot.
Mark D. Nozette

